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[ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ] a matter of principle we can only buy German steel. You would have to offer real- ly good terms& ); they might cast doubt on the technical feasibility of a proposed solution (That wouldn t work with the present output at our facto- ry; unless& ) or give too much weight to legal constraints on one side (Our legal department will really rap my knuckles with this proposal. We re going to have to change something in point 3& ). All such expressed limita- tions have one thing in common: they are designed to stampede us into accepting a less than satisfactory solution. If however you do see through the trick, you can call the other man s bluff and turn the situation around with a reaction such as (Well, that s a pity. I suppose I m going to have to look elsewhere& ). The other guy now has to give way at this point, or lose the deal. If he is really interested in doing business, he will have to pay for his attempted deceit with expensive concessions. The precedent One of the standard tactics used by many negotiators is to allude to a precedent. They do this by comparing the present negotiation to earlier agreements (In the past we ve always had 25 per cent off& ) or other offers currently available to them (X & Co. is offering us a comparable product that is five per cent cheaper than yours& ) but only of course when its suits them. Man is a creature of habit, and can easily be led in the desired direction when told of such conditions. The tactic is easy to use, but because it is so widespread it is just as easily rumbled. Admittedly, it isn t likely to do any harm: it was always worth a try. It is also relatively easy to counter: you only have to demonstrate with some credibility that the present sit- uation is not really comparable to the case held up as precedent. Either the conditions have changed, or the offer referred to has other disadvan- tages. Why should anyone want to continue negotiating with you if he 138 Tactics supposedly can get a much better deal from the competition? He must have some interest in dealing with us, otherwise he would have trans- ferred his business elsewhere a long time ago. Regulations and standards A similar tactic is found when people insist that products, components, or even agreements in international law need to satisfy certain standards. In line with this ploy, bilateral agreements must be Europe-compatible, or be able to withstand scrutiny by the High Court or a referendum. Such insistence on existing standards or regulations can bring in all sorts of concessions. Whatever cannot ostensibly be changed (whether it really could is another matter) has to be accepted by the other party, if he is really keen on striking a deal. With that the blame can be put squarely on someone else s shoulders (I m really sorry, but you know how strict our national regulations are& ), while the profit goes into your own pocket. Not a few national regulations have been created with this very consideration in mind. Threats Threats against people such as violence, terrorism or war are an instrument from the arsenal of unconventional negotiation. Under nor- mal circumstances we shall never find any reason to use such a tactic, and hopefully we will never find ourselves confronted by them. But in certain segments of society threats are the bread and butter of negotiation for example the police, the military, secret service or even organized crime. To deal confidently with such situations, which may sometimes even be life endangering, requires special training that is beyond the scope of this book. So here we shall limit ourselves to material threats (If you don t accept my offer, I ll buy up your whole company& ). They serve as a tactical confrontational tool, an instrument of a strategy that uses pres- sure and exhortation. In any other strategy the use of threats would be completely out of order, and even in situations of real confrontation or war the use of threats is only judicious when it is has credibility. This 139 Tactics requires a corresponding position of power and the willingness to exer- cise the threat if it came to the crunch. Nothing is more harmful to a posi- tion than the threat of a sanction that is then not put through. The European Union was to learn this bitter lesson on several occasions in the conflict around the former Yugoslavia, when it put neither its military threats against the Serbs into effect nor once the war was over its threat against the Croatians to withdraw the EU administration from the divided city Mostar. With that its credibility was well and truly kaputt. Promises, promises& Les promesses n engagent que ceux qui les reçoivent (Promises only commit those who expect to benefit by them). This fine French proverb is one to savour on the tongue exemplifying as it does the complete disregard for honour and trust so prevalent among the proponents of Real-Politik. This should not be read as contradicting the emphasis we have put on mutual trust in negotiations earlier in this book. On the contrary, we should always make every possible effort to establish a relationship of trust. The results of our negotiations will finish up all the better for that. But nor should we forget the old Russian proverb: Trust, but check it out! or the Sufi adage that enjoins you to trust in God, but tether your camel. Trust is not the same thing as naivety. Basically, it serves only as early evi- dence of goodwill, so long as there is no reason for mistrust. But it is only possible to know whether one s trust has been abused by keeping a close watch on your adversary s actions and his interests and options. In the context of negotiation, this means: make promises only when you can keep them and are prepared to do so. Promises made by the other side should be appraised critically and not automatically taken at face value. False compromises In Chapter 5 we discussed the disadvantages of the compromise solu- tion. Sometimes, however, it is the only, and therefore the best, option available to us, but note that the so-called fair compromise (What do you say? Let s split it down the middle) may be a carefully devised tactical move. 140 Tactics Three questions immediately come to mind. First, why should the mid- dle point necessarily be fairer than another? Most people simply seem to have a particular predilection for symmetry and equal distribution. And when it comes to it: what is fair? Second, the middle point always lies between two extremes, one of which will have been set by the other party. With a little forethought almost anything can be achieved in this [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ] |